JP,  July 30, 2004

The news is chilling. Iran is very close to obtaining nuclear weapons. Indeed, any objective observer must consider that in the near future, Teheran will have the armaments and launching capability to reach Israel.

This danger overshadows all other threats we face and explains why Yitzhak Rabin wanted the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolved before nuclear weapons could be aimed at Israel.

The government is aware of this danger, and in fact signed a memorandum of understanding with the US in 1998 saying that due to the danger of WMD proliferation and the existence of ballistic missiles, both countries would strive to reinforce Israel's deterrence and upgrade their military, strategic, and technological cooperation.

It also said that the US would view with gravity the threat to Israel's security from medium-range ballistic missiles. In the case of such a threat it would consult with Israel concerning the nature of the support, diplomatic or otherwise, America would extend to Israel.

American presidents have promised Israeli prime ministers that the US will maintain Israel's ability to use its force to avert a combination of threats to its security.

However, with all its significance - including a letter from President George W. Bush to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon - none of this amounts to an actual commitment to prevent a nuclear attack on Israel, and it does not resemble the commitments the US has toward countries with which it has a defense pact.

The deterrence mentioned in the memorandum of understanding refers to Israel's reported nuclear capability. Israel itself has traditionally been ambiguous about this capability in order to avoid accelerating processes of nuclear armament and to avert international pressure.

Now this ambiguity may be anachronistic.

Iran and Libya surely did not believe in it. And international public opinion is certain that Israel is a nuclear and missile superpower. The ambiguity also creates fiction - such as a report by a communications center in San Francisco that Israel has taken Britain's place as the world's fifth nuclear power.

Under these circumstances, ambiguity's merit is gradually disappearing. Nobody believes in it. But the bigger question is: What is Israel's response to the new threat?

You do not have to support everything IAEA chief Mohamed El-Baradei said on his visit last month to believe the information he provided in an interview with Haaretz on July 8.

According to El-Baradei, Pakistani scientist Abdulkader Khan negotiated the selling of nuclear-weapons secrets with 20-odd countries and companies. El-Baradei concluded that the Middle East has entered an era of nuclear proliferation, with the possibility of such weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organizations.

Clearly, the era when Israel was its region's sole nuclear player is drawing to a close. We are soon to face a completely new reality: a nuclear-armed enemy.

ISRAEL CANNOT prevent such a development. Even if the justified precedent of bombing the Iraqi reactor recurs - and it is very doubtful such a success can be repeated - in the long run, Israel's enemies cannot be prevented from arming themselves with nuclear weapons. They have both the money and the motivation.

This reality will cancel Israel's big advantage, dwarf all other issues such as borders and settlements, and threaten our very existence.

What can be done? On the face of it, we could rely on a balance of mutual deterrence, which is what prevented the Cold War from becoming a hot war. The problem is that the situation in the Middle East is different.

In the Cold War two giants faced off, whereas here we have tiny Israel - most of whose population is concentrated in the killing zone of a medium bomb - standing against vast expanses. Moreover, the USSR and the US never denied each other's right to exist. They coexisted peacefully.

Iran openly declares its wish to eliminate Israel, and the Arab world engages in hysterical anti-Israel propaganda.

Sure, we can assume that fear of an Israeli counteroffensive will deter the people who control the missiles - fanatical leaders want to live, too - but there is no certainty that the desire to kill the enemy at all costs will not overwhelm reason. The Iran-Iraq war, and the cruel missile war between Baghdad and Teheran that was part of it, is certainly no guarantee that mutual deterrence will work.

A complete nuclear demilitarization of the whole region would be good for Israel. Israel's official policy is to support such demilitarization - once all the countries of the region are at peace.

That is a just policy; but even without peace, it would be good if all nuclear weapons could be removed from the area and we could rely solely on conventional weapons for Israel's defense.

Israel has a qualitative edge in conventional war. The problem is not the idea of nuclear demilitarization, which in itself is good for everyone, but the lack of a supervision mechanism for its implementation. The case of Iran, whose lies only a fool would believe, is proof.

Moreover, any country that is a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty can inform the Security Council, with three-month notice, that it is pulling out, as North Korea recently did. Israel, which has extensive experience with the violation of agreements signed by Arab countries, is entitled to demand an effective inspection mechanism to guarantee its safety, including inspection that includes its own representatives. It would, indeed, be desirable for Israel to initiate such inspection itself - but it is doubtful such a proposal would be accepted.

There is also another kind of deterrence. A defense pact with the US, as part of NATO or otherwise, should be Israel's policy objective.

Such a pact, which must include at least one Arab country that has made peace with Israel, would make it clear to any enemy that Israel's existence cannot be threatened without risking war with a superpower.

The NATO experience proves the effectiveness of such a pact both in preventing war and in reducing tension between 'local' adversaries such as Turkey and Greece.

Such ideas have come up in the past as part of a peace deal between Israel and its neighbors, and Ariel Sharon's unilateral withdrawal idea can also be contingent on such a pact.

Such a pact would be worth tough territorial concessions as well as limiting Israel's discretion in initiating military action, because everything pales in comparison to the nuclear threat.

It is worth giving up the Jewish settlement in Hebron to guarantee the Jewish settlement in Israel.